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Narratives of Legitimacy

NARRATIVES OF LEGITIMACY: POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN
THE EARLY PHASE OF THE TROUBLES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND

Sissel Rosland
Abstract
This article examines the discursive construction of legitimacy in the early
phase of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The empirical material covers the
debate on internment without trial from 1971 till 1975 – a debate which
involved conflicting claims of legitimacy. Some strongly defended internment
as a legitimate step in the fight against the IRA, whilst others regarded it as
an illegitimate measure employed by a corrupt political regime. These
conflicting claims of legitimacy entailed a conceptual battle concerned with
the construction and authorisation of political order. The article explores
this battle along three dimensions: law, violence, and democracy.
Introduction
On the 9th of August 1971 the government of Northern Ireland
introduced internment without trial.1 Internment was meant to curb the
escalating conflict in Northern Ireland. However, when internment was
ended four years later, this aim had not been reached: Cease-fires had come
and gone; peace proposals had emerged and failed; and more than 1,300
people had died.2
This paper will explore the construction of legitimacy in Northern
Irish political discourse in the early phase of the Troubles. The empirical
focal point is the debate on internment. The general conclusion of many
commentators has been that internment alienated the Catholic population in
Northern Ireland (see Arthur, 2001, p. 114; Murray, 1998 p. 18; McAllister,
1977, p. 97-103; Ruane and Todd, 1997, p. 130; Staunton, 2001, p. 276.) The
undermining of state legitimacy can be seen already in the process of repoliticisation in the late 1960s. This process was, however, accelerated and
shaped by internment which accentuated a wide range of contentious issues.
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The debate on internment involved conflicting claims of legitimacy:
some strongly defended internment as a legitimate step in the fight against
the IRA, whilst others regarded it as an illegitimate measure employed by a
corrupt political regime. These conflicting claims of legitimacy entailed what
I, inspired by Frank Burton‟s (1978, p. 104) phrase, will call “a conceptual
battle” concerned with the construction and authorisation of political order.
Interpreting Legitimacy
The concept of legitimacy is used in a variety of disciplines due to its
usefulness in the conceptualisation of the process whereby authority is
produced not by force but by voluntary obedience (Barker, 1990, p. 11). It
has been pointed out that studies of legitimacy have dealt with a growing
number of institutions, linking their stability and the consensus they enjoy to
the existence of legitimacy (Zelditch, 2001, p. 40). But the concept of
legitimacy is not only applicable to a situation of stability. By paying
attention to disobedience, light may be cast on the conditions of and reasons
for obedience, since it is often the case that the reasons for behaving in a
particular way are more clearly stated when that form of behaviour is
threatened or in decline, than when it is commonplace (Barker, 1990, p. 6).
The concept of legitimacy has been closely connected to the name of
Max Weber, and he represents what we might call a “subjectivist” approach
to legitimacy (Weber, 1978). He stressed the empirical and historical
character of legitimacy, rather than its normative validity. To Weber it was
not legitimacy as such, but the search for legitimacy, which characterised
states, and he was subsequently interested in studying how authority and
compliance were justified. “Legitimacy” as used by Weber was thus both a
belief held by subjects and a claim made by rulers (Barker, 1990, p. 59).3
In studies that have dealt with issues of legitimacy in conflicts,
different conceptions of legitimacy have been employed. One approach has
dealt with non-state violence as a problem or as a challenge to the state. The
concept of legitimacy is rarely explicitly discussed in such studies, but it is
taken for granted that legitimacy derives from the law (see, for example,
Phillips, 1990, p. 77 and Wilkinson, 1990, p. 48). Since legitimacy here is
viewed as a mere reflection of law, other claims to legitimacy seem to be
overruled and ignored.
This approach has been challenged, however, and starting from a
critical view of Jürgen Habermas‟ theories, the political theorist Shane
O‟Neill O‟Neill has developed a framework for a critical discourse theory of
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democracy (see O‟Neill, 2000 and 2002). O‟Neill stresses the importance of
linking legitimacy to other sources than current law: for a law to be
legitimate it is also necessary that the law be passed without violation of the
free use of communicative reason (O‟Neill, 2000, p. 506).
In contrast to these (implicit or explicit) normative perspectives, some
studies have applied a more subjectivist concept of legitimacy through
studying how legitimacy has been established within a particular context (see
Burton, 1978; also Sluka, 1989 and Feldman, 1991). The issue of legitimacy
is particularly significant in a study by the sociologist Frank Burton (1978)
who in his book The Politics of Legitimacy, argues that the quest for
legitimacy is waged in a conceptual battlefield where: “claims and counterclaims represent ideological struggles within a discourse of legitimacy” (p.
104). Burton follows the subjectivist approach in examining the contextual
and conceptual bases of these claims, rather than their normative validity.
This article analyses the construction of legitimacy as a discursive
process. Having the historical character of the process of legitimisation at
heart, this study resembles the subjectivist perspective of Weber and Burton
rather than the normative perspectives. For the present purpose, discourse
will be defined as practises that constitute the objects of which they speak
(Foucault, 1972, p. 49). This concept of discourse highlights the constitutive
aspect of language and implies that power is constituted by “regimes of
truth” concerned with the creation of an ontological, political, and moral
order (see Malkki, 1995, p. 194, and Foucault, 1980, p. 13).
The public utterances are embedded within a historical context, and in
the debate the participants negotiate meanings which are never fixed but
continually undergoing contestation and redefinition (Chadwick, 2000, p.
292). A central challenge when researching the discursive construction of
legitimacy is to find a way to examine how participants in the public debate
represent the relationship between the state and the people. In the case of the
internment debate, three dimensions stand out as particularly significant in
the construction of legitimacy: law, violence, and democracy. Firstly, law
was significant since much of the debate related to the legitimacy of the
emergency powers, which legalised internment without trial. Secondly, the
debate was closely linked to the issue of violence: the escalation of
paramilitary violence was given as the main reason for the introduction and
continuation of internment, and in addition, the issue of state violence
surfaced through allegations that internees had been subjected to torture.
Thirdly, the debate exposed conflicting views on the characteristics of “true
democracy” and the status of the Northern Ireland state as democratic or
undemocratic.
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1
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In the following, we will explore how different narratives of
legitimacy were constructed around these dimensions. But first, I will give a
brief outline of the political situation at the time of the internment debate.

Political Context
The political landscape in which the debate on internment took place
was rapidly changing. In contrast to the previous fifty years – in which the
Unionist Party had stayed continuously in power and nationalist opposition
had become something of an empty exercise – the state in Northern Ireland
was gradually re-politicised in the late sixties. Inspired by the civil rights
movement in the United States, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association (NICRA) was established, attracting support particularly from
young Catholics, but also initially from Protestants. Thus in the early 1970s
the composition of Northern Ireland‟s political spectrum changed
considerably.
On the unionist side, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was still by far
the largest party. It was, however, experiencing a growing internal division
as well as increasing opposition from other unionist parties, in particular by
Rev. Ian Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) founded in
September 1971. DUP soon became an important force in Northern Ireland
politics and a persistent threat to the traditional dominance of the UUP. The
UUP was also challenged by a new right-wing pressure group, Ulster
Vanguard, and several loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster
Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA). On the other
side of the political spectrum, the UUP also lost supporters to a new
moderate and liberal party founded in April 1970. This party, called the
Alliance Party, gained support from a section of liberal Unionists who had
left the UUP and from some former members of the Labour party. The party
hoped to draw support from both Protestants and Catholics.
On the nationalist side the Social Democratic and Labour Party
(SDLP), founded in August 1970, rapidly became the most important
political force rapidly surpassing the old Nationalist party. It presented itself
as a radical, left-of-centre party and was backed by former supporters of the
Nationalist party as well as members of the civil rights movement. The other
strand within nationalist politics, the republican movement, was in 1970 split
on the issue of recognition of – and abstention from – the Belfast and Dublin
Parliaments. The party Sinn Féin then became two parties: Official Sinn
Féin, a left-wing party, (also going under the name “Republican Clubs”)
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which called for an end to abstentionism, and Provisional Sinn Féin, the
party generally known as “Sinn Féin”, which remained abstentionist into the
next decade.

Dimensions of Legitimacy: Law
The power to use internment without trial was laid down in the Special
Powers Act from 1922. Whereas the government legitimised internment as
the lesser of two evils, the anti-internment movement rejected the alternative
altogether. In general, unionists presented the internment powers in terms of
function and order, whereas the nationalist opposition portrayed them in
terms of principles, human rights and freedom.
Unionist Discourse on “Law”
When introducing internment, the UUP government characterised the
situation as war. The image of an emergency was supported by firm
evidence: statistics showed that violence had escalated from the beginning of
January up to the introduction of internment in August 1971. In an initial
statement the government pointed out that the figures revealed, “not only a
sustained, but a mounting pattern of violence, which could not be borne in
any community determined to stay alive.” The government had no choice, it
argued, but to enact the provisions of the Special Powers Act (Government
Statement, 21 August 1971).
The use of emergency powers was not regarded as an ideal solution,
but rather as the only viable option in the struggle for the restoration of order
(Brian Faulkner, The Guardian, 16 September 1971). Captain Lawrence Orr,
the leader of the Ulster Unionists at Westminster, was confident that,
although internment would not reconcile the opposing factions in Ulster, it
was certainly a step on the way to bringing order back to the streets (The
Guardian, 16 September 1971). The Prime Minister Brian Faulkner claimed
to know the identity of the perpetrators, and internment was thus a useful
instrument, because it only affected people who had “murdered in cold
blood” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1971).
The fundamental trust in the internment procedures was an essential
element in the unionist government‟s defence of the emergency legislation.
The prime minister declared that emergency powers were used with
reluctance (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1971) and he stressed that the
government had established a three-man advisory committee to review pleas
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1

- 25 -

Narratives of Legitimacy

made by individual internees (The Guardian, 16 September 1971). But in the
end, the decision whether a person was to be interned or not, was in the
hands of the prime minister. This should provide further reassurance,
Faulkner argued, putting his own integrity and authority on the line as a
guarantee for fair treatment: “I am not prepared to sign internment orders on
anybody unless I am persuaded that person has played a very direct role in
violence in Northern Ireland” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1971).
In a letter to The Times the Unionist MP, James Molyneaux, explicitly
declared that he regarded internment to be a denial of “fundamental
liberties.” But, he argued, internment was not only about individual liberties,
there were also other important liberties to preserve, he argued: “there is also
the fundamental liberty of every British citizen to live at peace under the
law.” Liberties had to be considered in context, he argued, and liberty to live
at peace under the law ought to take priority (The Times, 16 August 1971).
As shown above, the unionist government viewed the internment
powers as secure, just and legitimate because they were settled in current
law. Within such a framework the only valid political question regarding
internment was whether it served the purpose of restoring order or not. Some
voices within the unionist opposition, however, presented another answer to
this question. Ian Paisley argued against internment and rejected the Prime
Minister‟s claim that he had no choice but to introduce internment. He
claimed that Faulkner had tried to mislead the country by announcing he was
introducing internment as a last resort. According to Paisley this was a
deliberate falsehood, as not all processes of the law had been used against the
IRA (News Letter, 10 August 1971). Still, the unionist opposition mainly
presented the internment powers in terms of function (for a further
discussion, see Rosland, 2003).
Nationalist Discourse on “Law”
Whereas the unionist government presented the emergency powers in
terms of restoring order, the nationalist opposition immediately challenged
this priority. A cross-party statement including politicians, priests and
representatives of professional and business life in Northern Ireland, summed
up this view, pointing out that preserving human rights rather than order was
the most fundamental purpose of law:
A society without order is a distressed society, but a society without
freedom is not a society at all. If a choice must be made between the
legal preservation of order and the legal preservation of freedom,
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freedom must take priority (Statement in Irish News, 4 September
1971)
The opposition built its case against the powers of internment around
two issues. Firstly, that the power to intern was a perversion of law denying
individual fundamental rights; secondly, that the unionist government used
internment deliberately as a political weapon to silence the opposition. The
opposition believed internment to be an indefensible evil itself, irrespective
of circumstances (Statement in Irish News, 4 September 1971). Labelling
internment “a perversion of law”, the signatories of the cross-party statement
particularly stressed that the emergency powers eliminated the restraints on
power. By lowering the standards for evidence of guilt, persons could be
imprisoned on the basis of evidence that was unknown to them and which in
ordinary law would be seen as inadmissible. The internees themselves
protested against not being given the opportunity to defend themselves
against decisive yet secret evidence (Statement by internees in Crumlin Road
Prison, Irish News, 23 August 1971). In an open letter to the British Home
Secretary, the Derry branch of the SDLP argued that the emergency powers
in Northern Ireland did not adhere to the standards of English justice:
To you, internment in Northern Ireland may be only an abstract word in
a faraway place. You well know that English law in England holds the
liberty of the subject in high regard and that a man is innocent until
proven guilty. Only in the gravest circumstances such as the major wars
does your English Government set aside these laws and even then, they
try to ensure the minimum affront to the dignity of the person and the
maximum safeguard for rights and welfare. Contrast this with what you
have allowed in Northern Ireland (Irish News, 18 December 1971).
Explaining the direct effects of this point, a leading article in the Irish
News, observed that by using the Special Powers Act, members of the Police
Special Branch were able to re-arrest men who had earlier been found
innocent by ordinary juries. According to the newspaper this practise
undermined individual liberty which was no longer protected by law, but was
at the arbitrary disposition of Prime Minister Brian Faulkner (Irish News, 25
November 1971).
Competing Approaches to Law
To sum up, the crucial point of division on the issue of emergency
powers concerned the balance between order and rights: whereas Faulkner
and the government assigned priority to the restoration of order, their critics
asserted that the most fundamental task of the law was to preserve the rights
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1
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of the individual and to restrain the power of the state. On this ground the
opposition ruled out Faulkner‟s “lesser of two evils”-argument, arguing
instead that internment never could be the lesser of two evils.
It has been argued that by establishing what Homi Bhabha has labelled
“counter-narratives” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 300), marginalized groups can resist
hegemonic representations (Perry in Graham, 2001, p. 86). History has
shown that whereas the “positive rights” approach has tended to support
established authority, the theories of “natural rights” have been connected to
opposition against authorities. The theories of Rousseau and other natural
rights theorists produced a notion of legitimacy that transcended the
procedures and authority of the state, thus making possible the idea of a
legitimate revolution. With legitimacy residing in “a state of nature”, rather
than in the state, a sense of essential commonality is produced beyond
governmental procedures (Wolin, 1996, p. 41).
Dimensions of Legitimacy: Violence
To talk of legitimate violence in the debate on internment seem to be a
contradiction in terms. The word “violence” was rarely used to describe what
the speaker viewed as a “legitimate” use of force, whether this be by British
soldiers or paramilitary “defenders” and “freedom fighters”; “violence” was
the force perpetrated by one‟s opponent.
In their proposed role as peacekeepers in the increasingly troubled
society, the security forces had already entered the front stage of Northern
Ireland politics before the introduction of internment. Yet, their critical
function in the operation of internment regarding arrests and interrogation
made the security forces even more contentious.4
Competing Discourses on the Security Forces
Almost immediately after the first arrests on the morning of 9 August
1971, there appeared allegations of brutal treatment of the internees (see for
example Irish News, 10 August, 1971; Irish News, 13 August 1971). In a
joint statement the SDLP, the Nationalist party, the Republican Labour party
and NICRA proclaimed: “We demand that the military resume the role for
which they were sent here, the protection of people and areas against
sectarian attacks on their homes pending a political solution (joint statement,
Irish News, 10 August 1971). The stories of mistreatment grew in number
during the first months of internment as several internees got to tell their
stories to the newspapers.5 Under pressure from nationalists in Northern
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Ireland, the government of the Republic of Ireland lodged a series of
complaints at the European Commission of Human Rights at Strasbourg in
December 1971. The Irish government alleged that British policy in Northern
Ireland had degenerated to a military assault on the minority in violation of
the European Convention of Human Rights (Boyle, 1974). Several persons
also submitted individual petitions to the commission (Boyle, 1974).6
Nationalists, thus, in general described the treatment of internees as
brutal and inhumane, and a violation of the rights of the individual. The illtreatment was not in the main regarded as evidence of the evilness of the
interrogators, but rather as the product of an aggressive state (see Rosland,
2003). Consequently, government inquiries into the matter could never be
trusted. Legitimacy had to be authorised elsewhere, and it is consistent with
this standpoint that nationalists looked to the Republic of Ireland and the
international human rights commission for confirmation of the perceived
illegitimacy of state violence in Northern Ireland.
In unionist statements, on the other hand, the security forces were
portrayed primarily as responsible protectors characterised by virtues as
heroism and victimhood. Already shortly after the introduction of
internment, the Prime Minister hailed it as a great success, which allowed the
security forces to work efficiently in their “relentless” struggle against the
IRA (Daily Mail, 16 September 1971). In October, Faulkner concluded: “I
think in the last three months that the security forces have got very positively
and demonstrably on top of the situation” (News Letter, 27 October 1971).
When rumours of mistreatment started to circulate, the government,
were keen to respond and assured the public that any claim of ill treatment
would be impartially investigated (News Letter, 16 August 1971). Yet,
questioning the mistreatment allegations, James Kilfedder of the UUP
suspected that the internees, in order to safeguard themselves against charges
of being informers, were fabricating allegations of Army brutality (Belfast
Telegraph, 20 October 1971). At the same time he contended that the
security forces should be allowed to use some kind of force, if this could
shorten the conflict. One had to choose between the terrorists and the
soldiers, Kilfedder argued, concluding that the soldiers‟ lives ought to be
regarded as more important than “the injured feelings of the terrorists”
(Belfast Telegraph, 20 October 1971).
Although the general unionist view was that the security forces were to
be trusted, there were some exceptions to this pattern. In some cases
involving loyalist paramilitaries loyalist and unionist politicians criticised the
Army for mistreatment. After an incident in the Maze prison in late 1973 that
left several loyalist internees injured, both Ian Paisley and the UDA
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condemned the troops for mistreating the internees (see Daily Mail 20
December 1973; News Letter, 20 December 1973; Irish Times, 20 December
1973). This occasional criticism, however, did not challenge the main
representation of the security forces as protectors of common good.
Competing Discourses on Paramilitaries
The debate on internment exposes several conflicting interpretations of
the justification and responsibility for paramilitary violence. According to
the government, the IRA was organising “a campaign of murder” with the
“responsibility for death and suffering of innocent people” (News Letter, 16
August 1971) and Prime Minister Brian Faulkner branded the IRA campaign
“an armed conspiracy whose immediate purpose is to destroy the peace,
stability and security in this part of the UK” (Daily Mail, 16 September
1971). The Prime Minister also stressed that the IRA was isolated from the
Catholic population, which it claimed to be representing. The main
distinction went not along religious lines, he argued, but between those who
pursued their ends democratically and those who wished to impose their
views by violence (News Letter 13.09.71 and Irish Times, 15 April 1974).
The Alliance party also to a certain extent supported the image of the
isolated terrorist (see, for example, Oliver Napier in Belfast Telegraph, 12
August 1971). Yet, the Alliance Party believed that introducing internment
would increase rather than curb the escalating violence (see for example Bob
Cooper in Irish News, 21 August 1971 and Oliver Napier in Irish News, 26
July 1974). Alliance reflections on terrorism thus, instead of drawing a
definite line between the agent of violence and the victim, indicated that “the
terrorist” could be both an agent of violence and a victim.
This logic was taken even further in the statements of the SDLP, which
firmly situated the republican paramilitary within Northern Ireland society.
Although condemning their use of violence, the SDLP also viewed
republican paramilitaries as “victims of the past”, thus placing the
responsibility of paramilitary violence not only on the individual IRA
members but on the Northern Ireland state (see for example John Hume in
Irish Times, 3 December 1973). The paramilitaries were also frequently
singled out as agents of counter-productive violence. Violence, then, was
depicted as both immoral and futile:
We believe in political means and political means alone. Anyone who
looks at our community to-day must be convinced that other than
political means only leads us deeper and deeper into the mire and
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increases the suffering of all our people (John Hume, Irish News, 1 July
1974)
Hume also argued that the responsibility for ending internment rested
partly with the IRA: if violence stopped, there would be no justification for
the continuation of internment (Irish News, 1 December 1973).
Few statements in the debate on internment, even from the republican
movement, explicitly defended the IRA as a violent agent.7 The purpose of
the IRA violence, however, was made very clear: it was to break the
political, economic and cultural connection with Britain. Republican
statements insisted that they had a mandate for their struggle from both the
people and the internees and the desire was that “the Irish people should
enjoy justice, peace and prosperity, in a free united Ireland” (Long Kesh
Comhairle Ceanntair, Sinn Féin, Irish News, 28 March 1972). In contrast to
“the isolated terrorists” in the unionist statements, the “republican struggle
for freedom” was presented as the manifestation of a birthright, a battle
symbolised by the loyalty to the graves of the past.
The loyalty of the loyalist paramilitaries, although to a different object,
took on some similar features. The sacrifice of the loyalist paramilitaries in
defending Protestants and the Union was a significant part of the
representation of the “betrayed defender”. According to loyalist groups, the
loyalist paramilitaries were defence forces helping the security forces. The
loyalist groups thus felt betrayed when the British Government introduced
internment of loyalists in February 1973.
The loyalist paramilitaries were not given a prominent role in the
different accounts of internment until after the internment of loyalists. The
moderate unionist representation of the loyalist paramilitaries is quite
interesting, for it shows that even though most acts of loyalist violence were
condemned, it seemed to be important not to be considered an opponent of
the loyalist internees. At some point it looked like the unionist parties almost
competed to be seen as the strongest supporter of the loyalist internees (see,
for example, Roy Bradford in News Letter, 29 September 1973 and Edward
Burns in Irish Times, 4 October 1973). Several unionist representatives also
initiated motions demanding the release of loyalist internees only, and
several district councils adopted such motions (see Irish Independent, 28
November 1973 and 21 December 1973; Belfast Telegraph, 13 December
1973 and 20 December 1973).
Nationalists challenged this reasoning and initially branded the loyalist
paramilitaries as extremists, who attacked innocent Catholics. However, this
image began to change after the first internment of loyalists in early 1973.
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Loyalists were now, particularly in republican statements, also portrayed as
class brothers and victims of internment, suffering in the same way as
republican internees (see, for example, the statement by the Republican
Clubs, Irish News, 31 January 1974; also joint statements printed in the Irish
Times and Irish News in August 1974).
Competing Approaches to Violence
In a study of the discursive (de-)legitimisation of violence it is
important to consider how the agents of violence are portrayed in the
political statements: by presenting the agents of violence within a particular
context the acts of violence might be explained and rationalised. With some
exceptions, discourses on violence in the debate on internment echoed the
various parties‟ representation of the use of emergency powers. On the one
hand, the unionist movement in general legitimised state violence through an
official legal mandate and the function of restoring order. In the case of the
loyalist paramilitaries there was an ambivalent approach, however, and the
question of purpose and context seem at least partly to come in to play when
separating loyalist and republican violence. On the other hand, nationalist
discourses stressed alternative sources of legitimacy. In the case of the
republican groups, they referred to discrimination as well as human and
national rights when justifying republican violence. Within the SDLP,
however, violence seemed in general to have been delegitimized through
references to moral values and inalienable human rights.
Dimensions of Legitimacy: Democracy
In the debate on internment all political parties presented “democracy”
as the legitimate form of government. It is generally held that it is the
commitment to popular rule which sets democracies apart from other
political systems (Dalton, 1988, p. 206). This maxim was generally
recognised in the internment debate, but the debate exposed conflicting
representations of democracy. Some connected democracy to the procedures
of the existing institutions of government; others linked it to ethnic/national
rights. They also had different views on how the people were to conduct their
“legitimate right to power”. Were the preferences of the people to be secured
through institutionalised channels of representation, or should the people
themselves defend their interests directly?
Unionist Discourse on “Democracy”
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To the Ulster Unionist Party, democracy was a set of procedures for the
election of representatives who carried out “the rule of the people”. The
decision to introduce internment was taken to protect this democracy. James
Molyneaux observed that:
in every election during the past 50 years they have shown their
determination to remain part of the United Kingdom under the Crown.
The electoral system is the same as in other parts of the United
Kingdom – universal franchise of one man one vote. Is democracy to
remain in Ulster or is the gun to take its place? (The Times, 16 August
1971).
Comments by Prime Minister Faulkner followed similar lines. Those
who had been interned were interned because of their disrespect for the
democratic means: “the essential conflict is between democracy on the one
hand, on the other those who wish to bypass democracy by terrorist means”
(Irish Times, 27 November 1971).
In general the unionist government disapproved of non-parliamentary
methods and it berated both individuals and the elected representatives of the
nationalist opposition for withdrawing from public bodies and declaring
support for a rent and rates strike (Government Statement, 21 September
1971). Although confirming the right to free speech (News Letter, 13
September 1971), the government promulgated a six-month ban on parades
and demonstrations when introducing internment: the security forces should
not be diverted from their essential tasks at such a critical time (Belfast
Telegraph, 9 August 1971).8
The unionist representations of democracy changed somewhat,
however, with the suspension of the Stormont parliament in March 1972 and
the subsequent negotiations on power-sharing with nationalists. After the fall
of Stormont and the agreement on power-sharing, the UUP found itself in a
grave internal conflict: would a power-sharing assembly and Executive be
democratic institutions?
Brian Faulkner, the leader of the power-sharing fraction, viewed the
power-sharing process as the route to a restoration of a Northern Ireland
parliament, and thus also to peace, order and good government (News Letter,
12 December 1973). Faulkner utterly rejected ideas of an independent Ulster:
“Independence from Great Britain, of any style, under any name, and in any
circumstances, is repugnant to our ideals, in complete opposition to our basic
policy, and would be ruinous to our secure future and disastrous for our
economic well-being” (Irish Times, 6 March 1973).
The opponents of power-sharing in the UUP had a different
interpretation and argued that the Council of Ireland proposed in the
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Sunningdale Communiqué was the first step to a united Ireland. They
therefore went into the United Ulster Unionist Council coalition with the
DUP and Vanguard. Austin Ardill of the anti-power-sharing wing of the
UUP claimed that the aim was, “to bring about the restoration of full
parliamentary democracy in Northern Ireland” (News Letter, 26 February
1974). This was despite the fact that the anti-power-sharing wing of the UUP
also supported some non-constitutional actions such as the Ulster Workers
Council strike (which eventually brought down the power-sharing
institutions). John Taylor, also of the anti-power-sharing wing, stressed that
the power-sharing institutions did not have the consent of the majority of
Northern Ireland (News Letter, 2 March 1974). In contrast to Faulkner,
Taylor did not rule out an independent Northern Ireland. In a joint statement
with the Vanguard leader, William Craig, he stated that:
we don‟t agree with those who would accept membership of the U.K. at
any price. If the British Government is not prepared to offer Ulster
sufficient powers, then we are of the opinion that a negotiated
independence for Ulster could be the best course of action for loyalists
(Irish Times, 17 January 1973).
The Democratic Unionist Party primarily commented on the
suspension of Stormont in terms of British citizenship rights (News Letter, 27
March 1972). The calls for independence were strongly disputed by the DUP
which instead advocated a stronger integration of Northern Ireland in the
Union. This did not mean that the DUP was not also concerned with the
“loyal Ulster people”. Even though the DUP primarily defended
constitutional means of politics (see News Letter, 16 February 1972; 27
March 1972) and Ian Paisley did not support the loyalist strike in the wake of
the internment of loyalists (Irish Times, 8 February 1973), the party regularly
defended the actions of loyalist paramilitary groups (see Rankin and Ganiel,
this volume).
Nationalist Discourse on “Democracy”
Whereas both the DUP and the majority of the unionist parties related
democracy to the rule of the majority, this view was strongly contested by
nationalists. The SDLP generally stressed the importance of political
representation, but did not regard the majority rule of the UUP in Northern
Ireland to be real democracy. During the debate on internment the key
element in the SDLP vision of real democracy was above all inclusion. New
political institutions had to be built in order to include all sections of the
community.
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Although established as late as 1970, the SDLP had by the introduction
of internment in August 1971, already acquired the experience of working
both inside and outside the existing political institutions. The party‟s seven
Stormont MPs decided to pull out of Stormont in the summer of 1971 in
protest against the unionist government. When internment was introduced in
August, the party supported a rent and rates strike and extended its boycott of
public institutions (Irish News, 10 August 1971). Despite such support for
civil disobedience, however, the position of the SDLP did differ from that of
the civil rights and internees‟ groups (see below), since it continuously
stressed the importance of political representation and responsible leadership.
In John Hume‟s words, this was a time for brains, not for brawn (Irish News,
11 September 1971).
But even though the SDLP-deputies wanted to lead the people, they
also recognised the importance of being in touch with popular sentiments.
Representatives should not be too far ahead of the people, Gerry Fitt
explained, when he refused to participate in talks with the unionist
government after internment (The Times, 30 September 1971).
Still, after the suspension of Stormont and its involvement in talks on
power sharing, the SDLP resumed its cooperation with the British
government and reversed its previous commitment not to participate in any
institutions as long as internment remained in force. Now, representation and
influence, it was claimed, made it possible for the SDLP to lobby for the
release of internees. The SDLP leader, Ivan Cooper, warned against the
dangers of taking politics back into the streets: “Demonstrations at this time
will not bring internment to an end and will not secure the type of change
needed in this community” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1973).
It was important for the SDLP to have an Irish dimension included in
the Sunningdale Agreement. The majority within the party believed that the
nationalist community in Northern Ireland could not give its full allegiance
to a state that existed purely in a British context (Murray, 1998, p. 22). Even
though the Executive broke down the party still held on to the constitutional
approach to politics and the vision of partnership “not merely in Northern
Ireland and within Ireland, but in a very real sense between the two islands
themselves” (John Duffy, Irish News, 20 July 1974).
Civil Rights Movement and Republican Discourse on “Democracy”
When internment was introduced, NICRA immediately called for
public demonstrations throughout Northern Ireland and for workers to
prepare for a general strike (News Letter, 10 August 1971). The association
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claimed that the people themselves ought to be safeguarding their rights
against incursions from the government: “We believe the greatest weapons
of the people in the campaign are civil resistance and disobedience” (Ian
Barr [chairman of the NICRA branch at the prison ship, Maidstone], Irish
News, 15 September 1971). The internees in the Long Kesh internment camp
similarly supported popular control and direct action stressing that:
“Republicanism is concerned with the right of the people to control the
political, economic and cultural life of our country” (Irish Times, 28 July
1972).
In other words, people should not wait for the politicians to act in their
defence; the people should act themselves. The strong belief in the wisdom
of the people and the fundamental distrust in politicians were common to
both NICRA and the various internees groups established in the internment
camps. The internees in Long Kesh claimed for example that, “the ordinary
man having borne the brunt of the suffering over the past few years against
the might of the British Army, must assert his will on the wily politicians
who even now are snarling at each other in their attempt to claim political
capital from a false victory” (Irish News, 25 April 1972).
The internees at Long Kesh rejected the SDLP‟s claims that its strategy
would eventually secure the end of internment, claiming that while the
people suffered, the SDLP connived with the enemies of Ireland and reneged
on all its promises: “You speak for no other than yourselves” (Irish News, 6
December 1975). Although sharing a common view on popular participation,
there were nonetheless differences between the republican groups. Whereas
the Republican Clubs supported some kind of political action inside the
existing structures, 9 the Provisional republicans, both inside and outside the
internment camps, ruled out such action. 10 In the Provisional view,
democracy could never be achieved through “partitionist institutions” (Irish
News, 6 December 1975). The Irish people could only achieve justice in a
free United Ireland, and it was important that the people rejected the “palaceseekers” who wanted to divert people from the true national aim (Irish News,
28 March 1972).
Competing Approaches to Democracy
As we have seen above, the representations of democracy differed
considerably among the political parties. The UUP in the first year of the
debate, and later the Faulkner unionists defended representation in elected
institutions as the main system of popular rule. The SDLP and the antipower-sharing fraction of the UUP, also stressed the importance of
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representatives, but departed from “the responsible model” in that they did
not rule out civil disobedience. The civil rights association and the
republican (at times also loyalist) groups played down the role of the
representative in politics altogether, and connected popular rule to direct
popular action.
Another significant difference concerns the issue of majority rule
versus “inclusive” government. Here the initial pattern was that the unionist
parties viewed democracy as majority rule, whereas the SDLP, the Alliance
party, the NICRA, and the republican groups considered the practice of
majority rule exclusionary and undemocratic. When the Stormont parliament
was suspended, however, this pattern changed. The UUP split on the issue of
a power-sharing Executive, and the SDLP came under criticism from NICRA
and, in particular, internees and Provisional republicans for taking part in the
Executive. Now the unionist parties did not agree as to which measures
would secure democracy: the DUP claimed that democracy could only be
safeguarded if the Union was retained. Faulkner and his supporters chose
power-sharing whereas his critics in the UUP and Vanguard indicated
support for an independent Northern Ireland. In this matter, the logic of the
latter resembled that of the Provisional republicans. Both perspectives linked
democracy to some sort of ethnic/national right to autonomy, rather than to
participation in the existing institutions.
Conclusion
The analysis of the political debate on internment has revealed that the
dominant unionist representation of legitimacy was linked to the state in an
almost tautological relationship: the internment powers were legitimate
because they were settled in law; force used by the police and the army was
legitimate because they had a mandate from the state; and democracy was
viewed as the implementation of majority rule as set down in the governing
procedures of the state. Consequently the principal points of reference for
legitimacy were the procedures of the state and the “will of the majority”.
Within such a framework, opposition to the state became illegitimate
by definition, and the only valid political question regarding internment was
whether it served the purpose of restoring order or not. Internment was aimed
at restoring order by removing the “terrorists” from the streets. The
“terrorists”, portrayed as isolated characters without context and history, and
with the creation of fear as their only rationale, played a decisive role in the
unionist construction of legitimacy, proving that the conflict was a matter of
order, rather than of state legitimacy.
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But nationalists saw things differently: many felt that the unionist
hegemony had been clearly exposed in the 1960s and internment accelerated
the ongoing process of political mobilisation of the nationalist community.
The political mobilisation was taken to a new level by a wide-ranging
withdrawal from public positions, an illegal rent and rates strike, and through
an intensified campaign of protest.
The nationalist counter-narrative of legitimacy was above all exposed
in the way nationalists challenged the unionist priority of the order of society
over the rights of the individual. In the nationalist narrative, human rights
were made the defining source of legitimacy and consequently, rights were
made a product of being human, rather than being a citizen in a state: if the
state violated these rights, it could not be regarded legitimate. Nationalists
also increasingly turned to international sources for validation of their
approach, thus “removing” legitimacy from the political and territorial
confinements of the state, and relocating it at an international level.
There is no doubt that the division between a dominant narrative of
legitimacy on the one hand, and a counter-narrative on the other, was deep in
the debate on internment. Still, the debate on internment also exposed
another line of division, supplementing this dualism: between a political
centre on the one hand, and a politically marginalized periphery on the other.
The fall of Stormont in 1972 changed the balance of power in Northern
Ireland: the UUP lost governing powers, and the unionist opposition lost the
power it had acquired by being the closest challengers to the UUP. The
SDLP, on the other hand, increased its influence: From being a party
permanently blocked as a minority in Northern Ireland, the party now
became the “voice” of the minority in talks with the British government and
in the power-sharing Executive. This alteration of power relations
challenged, or perhaps more accurately supplemented, the general pattern of
a unionist hegemonic narrative of legitimacy contested by a nationalist
counter-narrative.
The SDLP developed a more functional approach to law and
democracy during its participation in the power-sharing executive. The
keyword behind this transition seems to be “trust”; the SDLP‟s experience of
increased political influence went hand in hand with the development of faith
in the processes of government. In contrast, parts of the UUP, the DUP, and
the loyalist paramilitaries went in another direction after the suspension of
the Stormont parliament (and also the internment of loyalists). With the
Stormont government replaced with a British government defending power
sharing and internment of loyalists, the sense of faith and assurance of
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political influence were disappearing. Legitimacy was now disconnected
from the existing institutions of government and situated in principles of
British civil liberties or in the idea of Ulster self-determination.
The construction of legitimacy must therefore be viewed in relation to
trust and influence: political pragmatism and functionalism, which
legitimised the call for the restoration of order, required a sense of trust in the
system and a confidence of political influence. In contrast, the lack of trust
and influence seems to have fostered an approach based on rights and
principles external to the established institutions of government; an approach
which could justify resistance and change.

Endnotes
* I am grateful to all of those who have offered comments on this study at
different stages, in particular the late Professor Øyvind Bjørnson, Professor
William Hubbard, Svein Atle Skålevåg, Merethe Winsents and Maja Zahl. I
am also most grateful to Catherine O‟Donnell and Katy Hayward for their
very constructive and motivating comments and to the participants at the
Peace Lines conference in Dublin in June 2007, for inspiring and fruitful
discussions.
i

In that period, a total of 1981 persons were held without trial: 107
“loyalists” and 1874 “republicans”.
2 In the two years prior to internment, 66 people were killed; in the first
seventeen months of internment, the number had risen almost tenfold to
610 (Dixon, 2001, p. 118). Following the suspension of the Northern
Ireland government in February 1972, internment was continued by the
British government.
3
Weber‟s concept of legitimacy has been criticised, particularly for its nonnormative character. Jürgen Habermas (1996) has stressed the importance of
employing a normative concept of legitimacy through an understanding of
the relationship between solidarity and communication.
4
The Compton Committee was set up to investigate allegations that the men
being interrogated after their arrests on 9 August 1971 had been subjected to
brutal treatment (Elliott and Flackes, 1999, p. 211). The report,
acknowledged that there had been ill treatment of internees, but it rejected
claims of systematic torture. Another committee (the Parker committee)
investigating the methods used in interrogating, later held that the methods
were justified in exceptional circumstances (Elliott and Flackes, 1999, p.
391).
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5

For example, one of the internees, Patrick Shivers was awarded £15,000 in
February 1974 by the Ulster High Court in damages for wrongful arrest and
torture (News Letter, 14 February 1974).
6
The Commission determined that some techniques employed in 1971 did
constitute torture and that other procedures were inhumane and degrading
(Donohue, 2001, p. 121). Yet, the Commission was overruled in the
European Court of Human Rights in 1978, which rejected the word torture,
but accepted that the internees had suffered „inhuman and degrading
treatment‟ (Coogan, 1995, p. 129).
7
There could be various explanations for this. This type of statement might
have been censored by the newspapers, which declined to publicise what
may be viewed as violent propaganda. It might also relate to the fact that
republican statements tended to deal more with the effects of state violence.
8 The Alliance Party also generally argued that civil disobedience was not
a legitimate democratic method; instead the party called for talks and a
campaign that could foster understanding (see for example Robert G.
Cooper in Irish News, 21 August 1971 and Basil Glass in Irish News, 13
June 1974).
9
The Republican Clubs (Official Sinn Féin) viewed elections as one of many
ways to voice public opinion, rather than the main channel of popular
influence. When they decided to contest elections, the Long Kesh branch of
this group supported the move, arguing that by participation in the elections,
they were putting forward progressive and revolutionary politics to the
electorate (Irish News, 21 June, 1973).
10
Some branches of NICRA also argued against the participation in the
existing structures. One branch of NICRA ,for instance, sardonically
remarked that the SDLP and the Republican Clubs “nearly broke their necks
to get involved in another British institution which clearly has not a hope in
hell of achieving any scrap of democracy” (Bannside and District Civil
Rights Association, Irish News, 8 July 1975).
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